Beijing’s Favorite Taiwanese Politician

By: Clasine Bernstein 

When Cheng Li-wun met Xi Jinping in Beijing this month, she told him that Taiwanese people belong to the “Chinese nation.” She praised the Communist Party's achievements and pledged to improve cross-strait relations. Xi smiled. Beijing responded with “gifts”—easing tourist restrictions and facilitating agricultural imports.

Voters in Taiwan had a different reaction.

Cheng chairs the Kuomintang, Taiwan's main opposition party. Her April meeting with Xi marked the first time KMT and CCP leaders had met in a decade. At the Great Hall of the People, her remarks covered every talking point Beijing wanted: shared history, blood ties, opposition to Taiwan independence.

Public opinion tells a different story. Polls show most Taiwanese want to preserve the status quo, and a growing number identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Cheng has said she wants “all Taiwanese people to be able to proudly and confidently say, ‘I am Chinese.’” That goal doesn't align with where the public stands.

Cheng's political evolution has been dramatic. She once supported Taiwan independence and described both the KMT and CCP as “tyranny.” After serving in the DPP, she switched parties. Now she calls Taiwan independence “fascism” and argues that 90% of Taiwan’s culture and bloodline are Chinese.

For Beijing, she's a useful partner. China severed formal contact with Taipei after the DPP took power in 2016, though it maintains channels through the KMT. By supporting Cheng, Beijing gains leverage without negotiating with President Lai Ching-te, whom Chinese officials dismiss as a separatist.

The KMT retains significant power in Taiwan. The party holds 52 legislative seats to the DPP’s 51, and together with the Taiwan People's Party's 8 seats, the opposition commands a majority that has blocked budgets and initiated impeachment proceedings. The KMT also controls most local governments after its 2022 electoral success.

Legislative control hasn't translated to public trust. Taiwanese security officials noted that social media accounts linked to the CCP promoted Cheng's campaign for party chair. Xi congratulated her when she won. She attended a memorial honoring a CCP spy. These details matter to voters who already question the KMT’s ties to Beijing.

Cheng’s policy positions deepen those concerns. She opposed Lai’s proposal to increase military spending by $40 billion over eight years and suggested during her Beijing visit that Taiwan should slow its military buildup. The KMT frames this as pursuing peace. Some supporters agree, saying they want to avoid war. But there’s a difference between wanting peace and accepting Beijing’s conditions.

Analysts who study China say Beijing may overestimate Cheng’s base. While the KMT remains resilient, the party is divided. Moderate voters who might support the KMT on economic grounds grow uneasy when the party chair emphasizes Chinese identity.

The November local elections will provide a test. If the KMT loses ground, it signals voters reject Beijing's approach. If the party maintains or expands its position, economic incentives may outweigh sovereignty concerns.

When asked about unification, Cheng avoided a direct answer and said she seeks “reconciliation” rooted in shared history. For Xi, that was enough. He spoke about blood ties “that cannot be forgotten and cannot be erased” and reiterated that China will “never tolerate” Taiwan independence.

Cheng secured her meeting and Beijing secured its messaging but whether Taiwanese voters punish the KMT comes down to November.